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vs.
FARL HlJNIER and
lAVON HIJNIER, his wife,
Defendants and
Third Party
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
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)
)
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)
)
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Third District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Janes S. Sawaya, Judge
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Robert J. Dale of
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-1lN 'DIE SlJPRIH: CDJRT
OF '1HE STATE OF t1l'AR

IMPERIAL-YUMA PROtrel'Im
CREDIT ASSOCIATI~, a
corporaticn,
Plaintiff and
Respcndent,

)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)

vs.
EARL HUNTER and
HUNTER, his wife,

IAV~

)

Third Party

)
)
)

Plaintiffs and
Appellants,

)
)

Defendants and

Civi.l No. 233316

)
)

vs.
GIS LIVES'IOCK MANAGEMENT,

INC., a Utah corporation,
and GFDRGE L. SMITH,

Third Party
Defendants.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)

REPLY BRIEF OF AI'I'EI.MNl'

STATIMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an action by llq:lerial-Yuma against Earl and LaVon
Hunter to recover an arrount , alleged to be owlilg an account tnder a
level line of credit arrangement evidenced by a promissory note, together with attorney's fees.

Involved is the accuracy of an accounting
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-2prepared by 'J:np!r.lal-Yum and debtor identification. Also :Involved is
the propriety of m award of attomey' s fees to Inper:i.al-Y1.111a where a
CCUlterclaim with lllll.tiple issues was :f.nvolved and where no effort was

1lllde to allocate the legal services rendered in connection with the

counterclaim and other matters.

DISPOSmON IN 'mE 1..GJER CX>URT
The case was tried to the court without a jury.
Qrurt

awarded Plaintiff

j~t

The District

against Defendants, Earl Hunter and

LaVon Hunter, jointly and severally, in the sun of $9,135.93, together
with attorney's fees in the sun of $4,000.00, and costs.
At the time of trial the Third Party Defendants GLS Livestock
ManagEm!!lt, Inc. and George L. Smith were bankrupt and, accordingly, the
Defendants' Third Party Canplaint was not pursued.

RELIEF SOUGH!' ON APPEAL

Defendants-Appellants, Earl Hunter and LaVon Hunter, seek a
reversal of the judg;nent of the trial court by eliminating all charges
against an ''Earl H. Hunter" and eliminating the award for attomey' s
fees.

IDENTIFICATION OF TIIE PARTIES AND EXPlANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS

Earl Hunter and LaVon Hunter, his wife, Defendants and Appellants, are herein referred to as the ''Defendants," or where appropriate,
their
names.
Credit
Association,
Sponsored
by the S.J.by
Quinney
Law Library.
Funding Imperial-Yuma
for digitization provided byProduction
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-3the Plaintiff and Respcmdmt, is herein referred to

as the Pldl llr'if

where appxopdate, as 1 'IDperial-YUJa".
1

1

~

1

refers to a page referau:e in the naml of the c...

1

"r refers to a page reference in the tJ:a1sC:dpt of tbe

~.

STA.'lDIENl' OF FACI'S

The Court 1 s attentim is invited to the Statammt of Pacta 8111:

forth in the Appellant 1 s initial brief au:l to factual statamts u they
appear in the course of argunent.
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POINI' 1

IN PAYIW OO'lH' S DRAFTS DRAWN <E ''EARL
H. HUNl'ER'', AND CHARGm:; 1HOSE DRAFTS
ro DEf'ENilo\Nr FARL HlNI'ER, P1AINTlFF EXCEEDED DEFENDANT FARL HlNl'ER Is FG1ER OF
ATIURNEY, AND 'niEREFORE PLAINITFF HAD
'mE BURDm OF OFF'ERIR; EVIDENCE 'mAT
DErniDANT FARL HlNl'ER RECEIVED mE BENEFIT OF nDSE ''EARL H. HUNl'ER" DRAFI'S;
m SUCH EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED.
The testim:ny of Plaintiff's own branch mmager and secretary/

treasurer, Roy S. Richter, set forth at length on pages 5 through 10 of
Plaintiff's brief, does not evidence that the accomts of ''Earl H.
Hunter" and Defendant Earl Hunter are the sam:!, as Plaintiff contends.
The testim:ny does establish, however, that without any authorization
whatsoever, the Plaintiff treated those accomts as the Sam:! and applied
''Earl H. Hunter" charges to the accomt of Defendant Earl Hunter and
LaVon Hunter.

Mr. Richter never did testify that Earl Hunter and ''Earl

H. Hunter" were the sam:! persons.

He ~rerely testified that Plaintiff

applied the charges found in Exhibit 16 to the account of Defendants
Earl Hunter and LaVon Hunter.

Exhibit 16, however, contains not only

drafts for Defendant Earl Hunter, but for ''Earl H. Hunter" as well.

Mr.

Richter offered no explanation as to why Plaintiffs charged ''Earl H.
Hunter" drafts to the account of Defendant Earl Hunter.
In paying Smith's "Earl H. Hunter" dn.fts and charging them to

Defendant
EarlLawHunter,
Plaintiff
express
language
of
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization ignored
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the

-5power of attomey given by Defendant Earl Hl.nter to George L. aat.th for
Smith to make draws c:n Earl l:hnter's acc:::o\Dt with the Plaindff:

This will be your authority to pay drafts draliD QQ
Earl Hlnter and s:i.gr:led by George L. 9ui.th 1ilose
specinEn sigpature appears below £See Exhibit a.
Appendix A, page 1, of Defendants' initial brief).
The plain language of that power of attomey upcxll\hl.ch Plaintiff al-

legedly relied, gave authority to Smith to present drafts to Plaintiff
for payment on the ace01.nt of Defendant Earl l:hnter; there is no autlm'ity in that power of attomey. bJwever, or aery other doc:uaent, autbJrizing the Plaintiff to pay drafts draw c:n ''Earl H. l:hnter" and to cha%ge
those drafts to Earl Hmter.
Having exceeded Defendant Farl Hlnter' s power of attomey in

paying Smith's mauthorized ''Earl H. Hlnter" drafts and charging them to
the account of Defendant Farl Fhnter, Plaintiffs had the burden not only
of establishing that Earl lhnter and ''Earl H. lhnter" are the saae
individuals, but of showing also that Defendant Earl lhnter received the
benefit of those drafts.

Plaintiff offered no evidence, however, that

Smith applied any proceeds of those ''Earl H. Hl.nter" drafts to Defendant
Earl Hunter's interest or benefit in the cattle investment pool.

Sig-

nificantly, Plaintiff did not even attempt to argue in its brief that
any such evidence was presented at trial.

To the contrary, Plaintiff

admitted at trial that it had no idea where the funds from the ''Earl H.
Hunter" draws went (T-18); nor do the Defendants, since all the facts
pertaining to the "Earl H. Hm.ter" drafts were in the exclusive possession of the Plaintiff.
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-6It does not follCM and is illogical to argue, as Plaintiff
alternatively does on pages 10 and 11 of its brief, that because Plaintiff stipulated and testified at trial that the Defendant in the instant
case, Earl linter, is entitled to ''Earl H. Hunter" credits (T-66 and T67; see pages 12 and 13 of Defendants' initial brief), Defendant is
therefore bomd to accept "Earl H. linter" charges.

Since Plaintiff Yl8l

in exclusive possessicn of the facts regarding the "Earl H. Hunter" and
Earl linter accmnts, it may well be that Defendants are entitled to
Dm"e credits than stipulated and testified to by Plaintiff.

It is

findalllmtal, however, that Plaintiff still has the burden of proving
that the disputed charges are for Defendants' account.
Plaintiff also i!Iplies on page 11 of its brief, but stops
short of expressly asserting, that because cnly one ''Hunter" naiiEs
appears en the Hanalei distribution slips (Exhibit 18) , and because all
credits and charges to Defendants' account bear the reference ''Hanalei",
there was cnly one Hunter investor in the Hanalei group.
stops short of making that assertion for good reason:

Plaintiff

Plaintiff well

knows that there was no evidence whatsoever before the trial court that
the Defendant Earl Hunter was the only ''Hunter" in the United States or
elsewhere who was an investor in the Hanalei group.

As a matter of

fact, the Plaintiff presented no evidence whatsoever of who made up the
Hanalei pool.

Exhibit 18 does not even purport to be an exhaustive

listing of all individuals throughout the United States and elsewhere
involved as investors in the ''Hanalei" cattle feeding group.
In addition, Smith was involved in ImilY cattle feeding pools
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7and many deals all across the cnntry (T-51).

At. the t1a of lbd:ar'a

dealings, liJperial-Ylllll had about thirty-four (34) loa1a of the t,..
involving Earl HL.nter -- b:ansact1ons with Slli.th (T-41, 42, 47).

r.-

perial-Yuoa did not have any way of knawing hr:u IIRIY l.om8 it 11DU.l.d haw
had at any tiJie involving !bi.th; they did not keep t:rack of the IUiber
(T-43).

Inperial-Ylllll was financing cnl.y a porticn of Slli.dl.'s c:Etle

feeding pools (T-51).

liJperial-YuDa was probably in fiw or six other

pools right in that area (T-51, 52).

'1he IlUiber of people in the wr-

ious pools would differ (T-52) and liOUl.d involve people tlm:Jugbout the
United States (T-52) and, in addition, there are a IlUiber of other pools
that Smith might have had that were being financed with other cx:Jqlf!llies
or where other investors were involved (T-52).

Accord:ingly, no coo-

elusions can be drawn at all fran Exhibit 18 as to lilether there were
other investors in the United States or elsewhere with names similar to
the Defendant Earl J:h.nter (e.g., ''Earl H. Hmter"), who were investors
in the "Hanalei" feeding pool.
Finally, Plaintiff cites four cases on ~s 11 and 12 of its
brief which Plaintiff apparently contends stand for the proposition that
the burden was on Defendant Earl J:h.nter to prove that Defendant Earl
Hunter and ''Earl H. Hunter" are not the sane individual.

None of those

cases, however, dealt with exceeding the authority of a power of attorney nor were the respective facts regarding identity exclusively in
the possession of the prevailing party, as in the instant case.

In

addition, in each of these cases, unlike the facts in the instant case,
either substantial evidence was presented or there was no dispute as to
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-8who the person was whose name was in questicn.

See, Nelson v. Dis-

trict Court, 320 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1957) (court listed at length substantial evidence offered by Plaintiff showing Defendant, Elizabeth G.

Nelsen, was saue ''Elizabeth L. Nelsen" involved in aut:cm:>bile accident;

the court stressed Defendant's failure to present any rebuttal test:imty
or evidence when Defendant knew whether she was involved in the accident); Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc., 348 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1959)
(holding it inccnsequential that a su:mr:ns named "Odessa Clark" instead
of Odessa W. Clark, because it was mdisputed that the individual

served, by whatever name, owed the debt, tlrus m:lk:ing the defense in that
case cne of a mere teclm:ical error in the

SUIIIIDrlS

rather than a question

of identity); Tate v. State, 122 S.E. 2d 528 (Ga. App. 1961) (holding
inconsequential errcneous allegations in an indictment naming ''Carmie

Lyrm Day" rather than Connie Arme Day, the minor child actually abandoned, where there was "no question but the identity of the child was
proved as being the infant referred to in the indictment"); Bowlin v.
Freeland, 289 S.W. 721 (Tex. Ct. App. 1926)

(analysis of separately

recorded chains of title disclosed apparent corrm:m grantor evidencing
coomm identity of "J. K. Freeland" and "J. R. Freeland" as grantor; no
other factual circumstances cited to suggest otherwise).
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-9FOINI' II
'DIE FAcr mAT SMI'lH WAS 'DIE lEFENDI\Nl'' S

mr

AGmr om
Al1l'HlRIZE 'DIE 1'IAml'DF
TO CHARGE TO DEFEMlANl'S' AaXUn' ImAFIS
DRAm BY SMI'lH
AtOl1IER PF.BSI{' J£comr WITID1l' DEFENDANrS' ~

m

s

Plaintiff illogically argues in Point II (page 13 and 14) of
its brief that because Plaintiff paid !mi.th' s UUIUthorlzecl "Earl H.
Htnter" drafts and thereby exceeded Defendant Earl linter's power of
attorney, the Defendants are bol.nd by Pla:intiff's actials.
ment is contrary to ftndamental agency law.
and limited.

'lb1s argu-

!mi.th' s agatey liiBS express

When Plaintiff allowed !mi.th to exceed his agatey, the

Plaintiff dealt with him at its (the Plaintiff's) peril -- mt at the
Defendants' peril.
Plaintiff's argtm![lt ignores the express and limiting language
of Defendant's power of attorney that Plaintiff claims to have relied at
in paying Smith's ''Earl H. Hwter" drafts:
This will be your authority to pay drafts drawn
on Earl Hwter and sil!}:led by George L. Smith,
whose specimen sil!}:lature appears below [See
Point II, p. 18 of Appellants' initial brief for
discussion regarding this power of attorney] .
It is incredible to argue that the Plaintiff, having paid
"Earl H. Hwter" drafts not authorized by Defendant Earl Hwter, is
entitle to charge those drafts against Defendant Earl Hwter because
George L. Smith was Earl Hwter's agent.

Smith was Defendant Earl

HUlter' s agent with only such authority as is set forth in the power of
attorney.

That document gave no authority to Plaintiff to pay any

Sponsored
by thesubmitted
S.J. Quinney Lawby
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Fundingfor
for digitization
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rn

Po;int 11 (page 18-21) of their initial brief' Defendants

cite casea that Plaintiff takes no exception to which clearly support th

fuldaaental propositim that Plaintiff could not know:ingly or negligently
allow George L. Smi.th to exceed the express written authority given him
by Defendant Earl Hmter and then take the position that Defendant Earl
Hmter is bol.lld by the actions of Smi.th and the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff,

en the other hand, cites no cases supporting its position; nor do De-

fendants believe it could.
At the very least, because Plaintiff allowed George L.

Smith~

draw drafts, contrary to the written power of attomey, on the account of
''Earl H. Hlnter" rather than Defendant Earl Hmter, it was incuni:Jent uprn
Plaintiff to establish that the monies so drawn by George L. Smith for
''Earl H. Hunter" were then applied to the benefit of Defendant Earl
Hunter in the cattle invest:JIEnt pool in which he was an investor.
Plaintiff offered no such evidence.

POmr III
THE AYlARD OF ATI'ORNEY' S FEES TO THE
PlAINI'IFF WAS 00'1' BASED ON !illY SUP-

PORTING EVIDENCE, NO EVIDENCE "WHATSOEVER HAVING BEEN PRESENTED AS TO
THE EFFDRTS OF PlAINTIFF' S COUNSEL
IN PROSECUITNG THE PROMISSORY NOI'E

AS OPPOSED TO DEFENDTIX; AGAINST DEFENJ}I,NTS' COUNTERClAIM AND RESISTING
THE CLASS ACTION "MJTION
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-11Jn Point III begiming en page 14 of ita brief, ftalnttff
recites the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 13 to the effaet tt.t tba
award of $4, 000.00 attomey' s fees to Plaintiff 1a a ~ llt:tXEney' s fee awarded to Plaintiff "exclusive of the Defendants' CIU\tarcla:lln".

Plaintiff then adui.ts, however, en page 15 of ita brief,

t:t.t

counsel for Plaintiff
did not make a specific allocatim of time spmt
beONee!l plaintiff's action en the promissory note
and the defense of Defendant's comtercla:im.
By admi.ssicn, then, the trial court had no evidence

before it

upon which to base the award of $4,000.00 attomey's fees for just the
prosecution of the note.

All the trial court had was the test:im:my of

counsel for the plaintiff that his total fees in the ent:he case had a
reasonable value of $7,164.00.

The court had no evidence of my kind

indicating how IIJJCh of that total effort was spent :In prosecuting the
promissory note as opposed to defending against Defendants' comterclaims.

How could the trial court, then, have possibly

call!

up with the

$4,000.00 figure other than to have arbitrarily imposed that figure an
the Defendants?
The arbitrary nature of the trial court's assesSIJI:'!Ilt of attorney's fees at $4,000.00 is striking when it is considered that the
total principal amount of the account sought to be collected by the
plaintiff

'\VaS

only $5,439.41.

For that small account, the trial court

a=ded $4,000.00 in attorney's fees and called it "reasonable".

Un-

doubtedly, if counsel for the plaintiff would have allocated for the
court his efforts between prosecution of the promissory note and defense
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-Uagainst the Defendants' comtercl.aim9, the trial court 1NOUl.d have been
apprised of the fact that a m.x:h mre substantial portion of the $7,164.00
fee was :IJicurred in defending the comterclaims, and not in prosecuting
the note.

Allocaticn, luever, by comsel' s own amussion, was never

uade; in that 1:egard, the Court's attention is further invited to

COUl-

sel's testimony elicited on cross-examtnation \.r-106-112).
Clearly, $4,000.00 in attorney's fees could not possibly have
been reasCXIBbly incurred in prosecuting this prauissory note for a

$5,439.41 principal am:n.nt.

Not even Plaintiff has contended, either in

its brief or bef01:e the trial court, that it incurred $4,000.00 legal
expenses in just prosecuting the note.

Of the $4,000.00 awarded by the

trial court to the Plaintiff as attorney's fees for prosecuticn of the
note, supposedly ''exclusive of the defense of Defendants' counterclaim!",

a large portion nust actually have been incurred in defending against the
fraud and security violation counterclaims and in neeting the Defendants'
class action tiDtion.
The instant case is a prine exarrple of why attorney's fees

carmot be assessed without test:imJny allocating the atton1ey' s efforts
between prosecuting a promissory note, which contractually provides for

attorney's fees, and defending against counterclaims, for which attorney's fees are not recov>erable, as the court held in Nelson v. Newnm,

583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978).
Plaintiff attempts to distinquish Nelson by arguing that since
the trial court in the instant case rrade a specific finding of fact as
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff, "exclusive of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t,

-13defense of Defendants' COtDteD!lama", ~ cbea 1lat ~FPtP. Yet, u
in Nelson, the trial court :In tbe :lnstmt ease aay mJt:

...-c .-:taawy'a

fees for the defense against tbe comtercl.ahB, nor aay

tz abit:alrUJ'

determine reasmable attomey' s fee& for 'Pft.'""utica of die ftJte 1lhm
there is no allocation whatsoever as to da
ecuting the note.

a efbt

~ :In p:oa-

It is particularly si.gpi.fiamt tbat :In...._ die

Court stated:
Cot.nsel testified that he had expended these houn
on the entire case, and 'had no idea' what portion
of that t:i.m! was attributable to the collection of
the notes.

Defendant is entitled to reasmable attorney's
fees for the note, as noted ante, but he failed
in his burden of m f with r e c to the EIJIDt
of tine necessari ~ B t for
t purpose.
[enpbaSis added; s~~d at 604).
Similarly, the Plaintiff in the instant case failed :fn its proof as
noted by Plaintiff itself on Page 15 of its brief:

"[Colnsel for

Plaintiff] did not make a specific allocation of time

be~

Plain-

tiff's action on the proorl.ssory note and the defense of Defendants'
counterclaims." Nelson clearly is en point with the instant case since,
as in Nelson, Plaintiff here has failed in its burden of proof regarding
the annunt of time necessarily spent in prosecuting the note as opposed
to defending against the counterclaims.
The Plaintiff's assertions on pages 16 and 17 of its brief that
Stubbs v. Herrm:!rt, 567 P. 2d 168 (Utah 1977) (cited by the Court in
Nelson) , is consistent with the trial court's award of attorneys fees in
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-14the instant case, clearly is not correct.

In Stubbs, the court affitm!d

the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party for
prosecution of a promissory note and the foreclosure of a nmtgage which
secured the note, while disallowing attorney's fees for the negotiatioo
and defense against a comterclaim.

Regarding the award of attorney's

fees for successful prosecution of the note and foreclosure of the
nmtgage, the Court stated:
Here, contractual liability is involved and the
court properly awarded plaintiff his fees for
the foreclosure. Plaintiff's att~ testified that he had expended 3-3/Bth
s on t:he
collection and foreclosure action [567 P.Zd at
171; enphasis added] .
As this Court observed in Stubbs, the trial court properly

awarded reasonable attorney's fees for prosecution of the promissory
note based upon testimony by Plaintiff's attorney as to the amount of
time he had expended on the collection and foreclosure action as well

~

on his test:imJny regarding the usual fees charged by attorneys in the
camn.nity.

By Plaintiff's own admission, however, there was no alloca-

tion at all in the instant case as to the ti.rre necessarily spent by
counsel for Plaintiff in prosecuting the prorrri_ssory note versus defending against the counterclaims of the Defendants.

Contrary to Plain-

tiff's arguiiE11t, Stubbs stands for the proposition that the trial court,
in awarding attorney's fees, must base that decision upon evidence
allocating the efforts of Plaintiff's attorney between attempting to
collect on a promissory note and defending against counterclaims.
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-15POINr IV

IT IDULD BE IMPROPER '10 mMAND nns
CASE FOR FUimiER EVIIlEOCE Rm\RDOO
'mE IDENlTI'Y OF EARL H. HlNl'ER OR n1E
ALI.OCATICE OF TIME IN AW!\RDIR; Al"'IRNEY'S FEES.
Plaintiff-Respcndent argues in Point IV en page 17 of its
brief that pursuant to Rule 76(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this

Court may remand the case to the trial court for further pmc:eed:l.ngs en
the identity of Earl Hunter and "Farl H. HLnter" and the allocatim of
attorney's fees.

Obviously, the identity of Earl H. HLnter and the

allocation of attorney's fees could only be further detem:l.ned by the
taking of new evidence en behalf of the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has had

its day in court and the opporttnity to atteupt to prove that Earl
Hunter and "Farl H. Hunter" are the sane persons and to present testinony regarding the allocation of attorney's fees for prosecuticn of
the pranissory note. It
bites of the apple and

~d
~

not be proper for Plaintiff to have boo

days in court where it had a crnplete op-

portunity, prior to resting its case in the trial court, to present
whatsoever relevant evidence it desired.

Defendants have already been

put to considerable unrecoverable expense because of Plaintiff's failure
to even offer evidence on these unresolved critical issues.
In addition, it is irrportant to note as indicated in Point I,

page 14, of Defendant's initial brief, that at the conclusion of the
trial, after both parties had rested and following closing arguments,
Plaintiff IIDved the trial court to reopen the case to allow Plaintiff to
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-16try to establish that Defendant Earl Hunter is "Earl H. Hunter".

The

trial court appropriately denied that mtion and Plamtiff has not
appealed fran the ruling.

Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires a party

who desires to cross appeal fran an order to file a statenEnt of the
points en which he intends to rely on such cross appeal within the tine
required by Rule 75(d).

Rule 75(d) requires the statenEnt of points to

be filed with:in 10 days after the service and filing of the appellant's
desigpation of the record on appeal.

No such statenm.t of points was

filed by Respondent pursuant to Rules 74(b) and 75(d) and thus Plaintiff
has not appealed fran the Court's order denying Plcrintiff' s mtion to
reopen the trial for the purpose of presenting additional evidence.

In

not cross appealing from the Court's aforesaid order denying Plaintiff's
notion to reopen the case, Plcrlntiff has already elected to forego any
further opportulity to attenpt to present evidence to the trial court
which it did not present during trial.
In addition, Defendants certainly were not under any obli-

gation, as Plaintiff i.rrpliedly contends in Point

rv

of its brief, to

assist in proving Plaintiff's case by pointing out to the trial court or
opposing counsel prior to closing arguments that Plaintiff had not
submitted any evidence that Earl Htmter and "Earl H. Htmter" are the
same persons, that monies issued by Plaintiffs to George L. Smith pursuant to the ''Earl H. Htmter" drafts were applied by Srrri.th to the cattle
pool account of Defendant Earl Htmter, or that Plaintiff had not allocated its attorney's fees between prosecution of the note and defense of
the
counterclaim. Plaintiff clearly had that burden.
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rn paying ::mi.th1 s drafts driM'l. cn "Earl H. llDter,"

a ct.a-

ing those drafts to Deferu:lant Earl llnter, Plaintiff ~ ])afen .....
Earl llnter 1 s power of attomey, and therefore Pla:lnt1ff hid the 1udlls
of offering evidence that Defendant Earl linter received tbe ba1efit of
those ''Earl H. llnter" drafts; no such evidence ws preamted.
The fact that ::mf.th wa5 the Ileferu:lant IS asent did not aJI:h-

Orize the Plaintiff to charge to Defendants' accomt drafts dalm by
Smith on another perscn' s accomt without Defendants 1 authorizatial.
1he award of attomey' s fees to the Plaintiff ws not based cn
any supporting evidence, no evidence whatsoever having been presmted as
to the efforts of Plaintiff's comsel in prosecuting the p!Did..ssory note
as opposed to defending against Defendants' comterclaim and resisting
the class action notion.
It 'INOuld be inproper to remand this case for further evidence

regarding the identity of Earl H. lhnter or the allocation of time in

awarding attorney's fees.
The judgnent of the trial court should be reversed.

The

Plaintiff has failed in its proof, both with respect to the accomting
and attorney's fees.
Respectfully submitted,
McMURRAY & ANDERSON

By~/fP'/£
~.~yand
~
Robert J. Dale
Attorneys for Earl and LaVen Hunter
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